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ABSTRACT 
 
In this essay, we draw the attention of scholars contributing to the broad field of organisation 
studies, especially that part of it that constitutes the sociology of organisations, to a problem 
regarding the maintenance of social order in practical intellectual life as a university 
employee. We direct our readers’ attention to the performance-related practices governing 
Business and Management scholars that are currently contributing to the most acute 
expression of this problem because they elaborate powerful individuating forces that 
undermine the existing social order, without putting forward any normative or positive 
commitment to what a different social order might be that would or should replace what was 
previously there. Our core concern is that this destructive tendency undermines the sociology 
of organisation as a legitimate form of social inquiry and ultimately undermines the capacity 
of organisational scholars to understand and improve social affairs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past, order has been achieved through the strength of the disciplines; thus, for 
sociologists of organisation, there was a tradition establishing a core curriculum that provided 
a social ordering that organised knowledge. Codified, this ordering clustered around the 
significance of various sociological paradigms in organisational analysis that provided 
grounds upon which legitimate knowledge and expertise could be built (Burrell and Morgan 
1979; Hassard and Wolfram Cox 2013). Working within paradigms and adhering to traditions 
of ordering evokes a disciplinary field in which paradigms can on rare occasion be crossed or 
mixed but that are, for the most part, upheld and elaborated. 
Disciplinary fields have social origins and as time passes are not immune to social change; 
where once the analysis of organisations was a largely sociological disciplinary endeavour, 
increasingly its habitus is that of the business school. Being in the business school has 
become a central feature of the training and employment relations of many contributors to 
contemporary organisational debates. As such, these employees are increasingly governed by 
audit cultures that attend more to grant getting and “impact” performance than to mastery of a 
foundational discipline and its paradigms. The latter is hardly metricised in a context in 
which disciplinary classification and framing is in decline; the former is highly so. Thus, 
accompanying efforts to improve the technologies of performance metrics (e.g. Baum 2011; 
Perkmann, et al. 2011), impel critically oriented scholars to investigate their performative 
nature (e.g. Gond, et al. 2016; Spicer, et al. 2016); however, over-emphasising valuation 
without any consideration of other social dynamics is leading critical scholarship astray.  
In particular, we are concerned about how critically oriented scholars now routinely neglect 
the problem of how disciplinary social order is maintained, assuming that all questions of 
order are functionalist attempts to constrain freedoms and all constraints on freedom are bad. 
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Doing so chimes with a world of journal publishing that is less disciplinarily classified in 
terms of the historic domains that framed professional work, such as sociology, and more 
oriented to hybrid, interdisciplinary and practice-related fields, such as management. The 
resultant neglect of problems to do with disciplinary social order is coupled with prevailing 
field-level preferences for crossing, rather than upholding paradigms, in pursuit of 
‘innovation’, thereby intensifying the very problem being neglected.  
The disruption and chaos that paradigm crossing and constant paradigmatic change implies, 
presents an attractive proposition for hyper-individualised researchers keenly alert to 
changing funding priorities and areas, who proceed as though communication of their 
responses to these quickly shifting interests is the only significant matter of concern, treating 
communication exclusively as a technical problem disassociated from long-standing 
traditions of scholarship. Facing the possibility of losing any control over the academic 
profession, some critical scholars have gone so far as to suggest that academics should 
therefore make more of their public presence as intellectuals (Dallyn, et al. 2015). The 
problem with this manifesto is that it further individualises the solution by putting the onus 
on the person, shifting our attention even further away from the problems of knowledge, 
scientific collectives and social order. 
Presently, the status of intellectuals and their claims are being broadly undermined (Nichols 
2017). Under these conditions disciplinary knowledge in general, and paradigm thinking in 
particular, are at a distinct disadvantage. They both denote a certain type of expertise that 
may not be in accord with contemporary policy priorities. Rather than ditch the relationship 
between knowledge claims and social order in the organisation of the disciplinary field, 
reliant on the capacity of sociological paradigms to remain relevant, we argue that 
understanding the importance of social order is an imperative for the ongoing rejuvenation 
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and long-term survival of the sociology of organisation. We begin by sketching some terms 
for understanding this sociological problem and try to open the door for a new approach to 
the sociology of organisations that will maintain a significant role for paradigm thinking 
albeit in modified form. 
PARADIGMS, DISCIPLINE AND THE QUESTION OF SOCIAL ORDER 
When handling intellectually significant concepts, such as that of “the paradigm”, it behoves 
us to consider how their history as ideas bears down on their use. Kuhn’s foundational work 
on paradigms emerged at a time when historians of science were concerned with the context 
of scientific discovery. From this point of view, the idea that incommensurable scientific 
worldviews bring about revolutions makes Kuhn’s work significant; he provides a master 
narrative for change that reinforced the centrality of justification organised around a solid 
core of accepted ‘truths’. Kuhn’s focus differentiated his work from that of philosophers of 
science who focused instead on the context of justification (Zammito 2004). The latter, which 
we can think of as the legitimation of scientific claims to knowledge, has been the preserve of 
positivism since at least the early nineteenth century when the sociologist Auguste Comte 
introduced this label to develop a joint theory of knowledge and progress.  
In the writing of contemporary philosophers of science, such as Popper (1962), a concern 
with the basis for the legitimation of scientific claims to knowledge provided a powerful 
moral philosophy of science.  Kuhn’s radical accomplishment was to dissolve the distinction 
between the context of justification and discovery entirely. Though many of Quine’s 
commitments are still at work in Kuhn’s ideas, including acknowledgment of holism, 
naturalism, fallibilism as well as the difference between types of propositions, he departs 
from Quine by committing to rhetoric rather than logic. The influence of Wittgenstein on 
Kuhn’s thinking is significant here. What binds the scientific community together in language 
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use is not a commitment to a logic but is instead a commitment to “a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (Wittgenstein 1953: 32), a form of language 
game that Kuhn calls a paradigm. So too, the similarities between Fleck’s conception of 
science and Kuhn’s ‘normal science’ (see: Harwood 1986: 177). 
In Kuhn’s hands discovery involves slow cognitive shifts that organisational scholars would 
think of as occurring at the field level rather than being rapid and sharp shifts between 
different logics. So “the question of why a particular paradigm should prove stronger than the 
rest turns into a question about the strength of the institutions in which it is grounded” 
(Douglas and Ney 1998: 30). At the same time, change is to be identified methodologically at 
the level of practice, which is what makes his thesis so appealing to scholars who might 
otherwise be disinterested in field-level effects. Methodologically, for science studies, Kuhn 
does to epochs in our own culture what Geertz does to other cultures for anthropology.1 At 
the core of the practice of paradigms is the central sociological problem of how individuals 
can achieve collective goals in a field of intellectual pursuit and how those individuals who 
might sense and experience the world in radically different ways can establish shared 
knowledge. A paradigm requires elements of normative, coercive and regulatory institutional 
support (Scott 1995, 2008), in order to be reproduced.  
Sociologist of science, Barry Barnes (2003) laments that the question of social order is one 
that remains underexplored with regard to the natural sciences. If we understand traditionally 
organised academic scientists in the way that Weber understood status groups, “wherein the 
particular mutual deference that members accord only to each other, the special honour of 
status... redounds to the collective good of the group” (Barnes 2003: 132), then we can see 
that social order is maintained through internal normative coordination, mutually appreciable 
cognition and regulatory exclusion of outsiders from activities. Collective autonomy for the 
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status group arises from this dynamic, and Barnes (2007) identifies how sociologist Robert 
Merton was right to emphasize and study this special kind of honour; in so doing Merton was 
able to see that honour mediates social relations in a manner that aligns and coordinates 
action and cognition, what is done and what is thinkable. Consequently, evaluative decisions 
regulating this kind of alignment and coordination can neither be wholly contained within the 
norms of the models and exemplars themselves, nor generated outside of the status group. 
The status group collectively decides the priority that attaches to individual differences 
generated from within the status group, whether these become matters of ‘innovation’ or 
‘deviance’. 
Barnes, in reading Kuhn as an extension of Weber, Parsons and Merton, produces a Kuhn 
that, as he advises, Kuhn would have difficulty recognizing. In particular, he stresses research 
as a practical social accomplishment: Kuhn, he argues, “offers us a glimpse of how the 
mutual deference that is a part of our basic nature as social animals has been essential at 
every level in the constitution of the most magnificent of all our technical accomplishments” 
(Barnes 2003: 133). A scientific community, by this account, has “the properties of a status 
group [that] operates in such a way that it self-repairs and self-constitutes” (Barnes 1992: 
266). Any such work of repair and constitution is irremediably social. As such, the capacity 
to self-repair and self-constitute is subject to erosion by both individually oriented, metrics 
driven appraisals of academic performance, as well as by the ongoing erosion of the 
legitimacy of expert claims as a social phenomenon. When the collective judgements of the 
community of scholars constituting a paradigm weigh less in the balance than these metrics, 
the power of the paradigm is weakened.  
The discipline of sociology, argues Barnes, has been reluctant to explain actions and how 
they cohere in terms of status groups. Rather than focusing on normative integration in recent 
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years the focus dominating sociological discussions has been more on the distinctions of 
creativity, knowledgeability and individual autonomy as the driving forces of innovation and 
scientific revolution. As a consequence, the topic of order, together with those of deference 
and honour, has been diminished in importance. In a world in which disruption is prized over 
order, in which the disorganising of existing fields seems more significant than their social 
organisation in practice, the implications of these shifts are particularly challenging for 
sociologists of organisation (Parker and Jary 1995). Yet, as we have intimated, the question 
of social order is taking on a new form in the so-called “post-truth” society, in which people 
distrust and even attack those systems that rely overtly on honour: the classic case concerns 
the realm of the expert and the respect that expertise commands (see Mance 2016 for a 
notable instance).  
As disorganisation increasingly takes hold as the cause as well as the solution to some of our 
most important public concerns, sociologists of organisation have to confront this problem 
directly. Barnes concludes that the recent lack of tolerance for honour systems is especially 
acute for status groups that enjoy a certain level of autonomy, such as professionals, technical 
experts and, of course, academics. Weber recognized long ago that people who are members 
of such groups were accustomed to being “secure in their own dignity” (Barnes 2003: 136). 
In Bauman’s (1987) terms, they were adept at the role of legislator, defining the way things 
were. Bauman foresaw this, presciently, well before the age of the Internet, and argued that 
the balance of power was shifting from ‘Legislators’ to ‘Interpreters’. With the rise of 
interpretative communities, secure in what today we might term their respective ‘bubbles’, 
the honorific and deferential projection and acceptance of status is eroded in favour of 
performativity that plays to the crowd, not the elites of the profession and their command of 
expertise. The increasing pluralism of interpretive communities diminishes the ability to 
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legislate amongst them in terms of worth and value, especially as these are apprehended 
within the bubbles of ‘like’ minded individuals.  
Elite legislation does not disappear but finds that, sans the respect and deference of old, it 
must now compete with interpreters’ accounts of phenomena that the interpreters proffer and 
favour over those that would be legislated for them. The fields of play are becoming many 
and mighty crowded. And here comes the important point, “[w]e remain as ready as ever to 
reward them [elite experts] well for their services but we increasingly insist on the rewards 
being monetary rather than honorific and deferential. Monetary reward denies or even inverts 
status relations, and erodes expert autonomy rather than reinforcing it, as deference does” 
(Barnes 2003: 136). Using this discussion of social order as a starting point, we can now turn 
specifically to the sociology of organisations. The structure of Barnes’ explanation of the 
problem with regard to science would seem to be equally applicable to the sociological study 
of organisation, though the specifics do differ in important ways. 
ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS IS OPEN FOR BUSINESS  
The introduction of individuating forces into universities – through business models aimed at 
measuring and improving academic productivity – has led to a growing interest by scholars in 
organisation studies to push disciplinary rectitude to the outer limits and introduce quickly 
shifting, contemporary, ‘popular’ knowledge claims to the fore. Ignoring the institutional 
peculiarities of business schools and pretending that their modes of knowledge production 
can be treated as though they are the same as those in the social sciences, amplifies the 
individuating forces we discussed above. The subjectification of institutional business inside 
the counsels of the business school is overwhelmingly represented by the relatively rich, 
powerful and elite framing relevancies and interests.  
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Earlier generations of scholars would have been initially schooled in the discipline, in 
sociology, psychology or economics, perhaps at a later stage of employment applying these 
disciplines to the interests of a business school, with substantial reserves of intellectual 
capital to draw on to mediate the subjective framing of institutional business that occurred in 
elite counsels. Today, however, much sociologically-inclined organisational scholarship now 
originates in the business school milieu rather than migrating there subsequently after nurture 
in the professional discipline; lacking such nurture it frequently disavows claims to ordered 
discipline as a form of action (see discussion by O’Doherty, et al. 2013). In the place of 
disciplinary sociology, more specifically the place that the formal organisation occupied as an 
abstract theoretical object forming the basis for a delimited object of inquiry (for critiques 
see: du Gay and Lopdrup-Hjorth 2016; du Gay and Vikkelsø 2017), we find instead a variety 
of suggestions for how to re-describe problems (e.g. Spicer, et al. 2016), rather than a 
sustained programme of ordered and ordering scholarship, as Burrell and Morgan had 
envisioned. Drawing on the arguments introduced in the previous section, what might we say 
was there before and what are we facing now? 
In a footnote in the chapter that develops the four-paradigm typology, Burrell & Morgan 
(1979) were explicit that they wished to expand the scope of Kuhn’s use of the term 
paradigm, though they never articulated precisely what this expanded scope would involve. 
In their words, “social theory can be conveniently understood in terms of the co-existence of 
four distinct and rival paradigms defined by very basic and meta-theoretical assumptions in 
relation to the nature of science and society” (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 36, fn. 1). In 
essence, they crosscut the order/conflict axis of the “two sociologies” (Dawe 1970) with that 
of the actor/system to produce their paradigmatic typology. We can now suggest, with some 
confidence, that this expansion was an attempt both to establish and to expand bases for 
social order in organisational analysis. By replacing a focus on paradigm contestation as an 
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historical process with a view of it as a contemporary tournament they allowed for a plurality 
of ways to be an organisational scholar, with their specific codes of deference and honour, all 
of which drew their legitimacy from diverse currents within the broader status group itself 
rather than from one more narrowly prescriptive tendency within the dominant fraction of 
that group. The dominant fraction, to be clear, was positivism, with its tribal rituals, signs and 
significations.  
The similarities with the terms that Barnes develops in his reading of Kuhn’s work should not 
go unremarked. More specifically, by developing the idea that being “located in a particular 
paradigm is to view the world in a particular way” and that the four articulated paradigms 
“taken together provide a map for negotiating the subject area”, further providing “a 
convenient way of locating one’s own personal frame of reference with regard to social 
theory, and thus a means of understanding why certain theories and perspectives may have 
more personal appeal than others”. Burrell & Morgan (1979: 24) provided a grammar for an 
overarching disciplinary system of honour and deference both more inclusive and pluralist 
than the prevailing hegemony of the late 1970s in which narrow strains of positivism 
dominated. 
Recent shifts in higher education that individualize academic performance (Sahlin and 
Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016), find particularly acute forms of expression in the business school 
(Parker 2014), inverting the relationship between the pluralities of core-margin and stability-
change on which paradigm thinking relies. The system of paradigmatic status and honour 
accruing from a collective, albeit collectively fragmented, form of academic practice is 
increasingly being replaced with a stress on novelty, discontinuity and innovation for its own 
sake, defined in response to terms that are increasingly stipulated outside of the disciplines, 
their relevancies and systematic codes. To find a tenable position in which paradigmatic 
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thinking might flourish under these changed conditions is increasingly difficult. Indeed, one 
of the accomplishments of Kuhn’s work was to bring humility to the idea of scientific 
progress (see also: Shapin 2010). Justification resides in the legitimacy given by a 
community of relevant experts. The key problem, again, is what Barnes refers to as deference 
and honour pitted against the clamour of the crowd and the immediacy of the market. 
To explain why this happens we could focus, exclusively, on mounting pressures which 
expect researchers to produce accounts that justify their relation to popular business practices, 
invoking both crowd and market (e.g. following Strathern 2000), accounts whose popular 
retailing means that they attract the attention of business’ institutional elites. “[K]nowledge 
production is subject to ruination” (Navaro-Yashin 2009: 7), in the most acute ways, under 
this concern with immediacy and faddism. However, we might also find explanatory 
purchase, by returning to Weber’s agonistic relationship between status groups and market-
oriented groups, which would explain managerialist attacks at various higher university 
levels on “status monopolies” established by the professoriate. Weber’s prediction would be 
that once the status monopolies of the professoriate are diminished, the institutional elites of 
management will attempt to establish their “capitalist monopolies” (see also Swedberg 2000: 
379). Both of these dynamics, expressed in audit culture and in attacks on the claims to frame 
problems appropriately on the part of the professoriate, are evident in business schools.2 The 
sociology of organisations has largely been translated to the business school as management 
and organisation studies in those many places, mostly outside the United States, where it was 
not already deeply institutionalized.  
The form of action taken by business school academics is compatible with a kind of 
methodological individualism in which each individual thinker is assumed to be freely 
choosing from within a cornucopia of already available concepts and signs. In mainstream 
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organisational scholarship, this finds expression in the permanent orientation toward the 
“newness” of signs within heavily institutionalized concepts. It can be observed, for example, 
in rituals such as the increasingly popular “paper development workshop” where the focus is 
almost exclusively on textual technologies rather than what is being communicated and why. 
Relevance, treated as a technical-communication problem, translating practice to theory, 
operates similarly to concerns with rigour, treated as a technical-methodological translation 
of research questions into methodological protocols. 
Critical scholars are not immune to these contemporary pressures. Implicitly the idea of 
critique follows Marx’s (1958: 363) assumption that “[n]o social order ever perishes before 
all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher 
relations of production never appear before the material conditions have matured in the 
womb of the old society itself”. Consequently, and similarly to mainstream scholarship, this 
form of action also seeks a kind of “newness” that uses concepts in an effort to proliferate 
paradigms and signs in order to reorganise the categories which furnish them though 
importation of novelty from other fields, such as philosophy and the humanities, often 
imperfectly understood. It is no surprise then, that the figure of the bricoleur is so popular 
among these scholars. Unlike the mainstream organisational researcher whose claims to 
distinction rest on technical interests, critical scholars rest their claims on art and craft that 
represents real but under-acknowledged interests.  
The attack on social order is also perpetuated at the level of critique itself. According to 
Hassard (1993: 117-119), the chief theoretical position of modernism is one of “systemic 
modernism”, which mechanises social order in such a way that knowledge facilitates social 
control combined with “critical modernism”, which stands against the “programmatic 
absolutism” of systemic modernism. The latter offers a critique of knowledge as a mode of 
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social control, favouring an interest in emancipation. Its attempt to “recapture the spirit of 
enlightened rationalism” (Rhodes, 2000, p. 19), has served multiple generations of critical 
management scholars well and continues to provide an important counter-narrative to the 
exercise of brute managerial control. Yet, at the level of social order, to which we have 
attempted to direct the sociology of organisation’s attention, this kind of critique may be 
facilitating the very systemic relationships of control against which it rails. 
As we have argued, the moral imperative to reject existing forms of social order and control 
as bad and mechanical leads to some deeply troubling and unanticipated consequences. The 
self-constituting and self-reparatory rituals of the status group espousing these oppositions in 
the name of repressed interests that they, as enlightened elites, can fathom, has been eclipsed 
by the market orientation of metricised business school organisational practices: for instance, 
it is well observed that critical scholars have profited greatly from the rankings conducted in 
these terms. Much as the Owl of Minerva, which begins its flight only at dusk, their wings 
have taken flight as the shades of night are gathering.
1 This is a kind of hermeneutic investigation of “everydayness” that many have derived from Division I of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, pp. xvii-xviii). It is also where Kuhn’s approach 
differs radically from institutional theory, the dominant approach for studying field-level dynamics in 
organisation studies. For exceptions, see Friedland & Alford Friedland (1991), and, more recently, Logue, 
Clegg & Gray (2016). 
2 In turn these dynamics are further exacerbated by the tournament for competitive grants sponsored by the state 
and its priorities for national investment, usually framed in largely instrumental terms.   
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